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Possible Remedies for Monopolis .. 
tic Conditions in the Lum-
ber Industry 
JOHN ISE, Ph.D., L.L.B. 
Associate Professor of Economics, Iowa State College 
In a previous issue of the Forester the writer traced the early 
history of the United States forestry policy. In a monograph 
which is now in the publisher's hands the history of that forest 
policy has been brought down to the present time, and the re-
sults have been analyzed in detail. In that monograph the 
writer has indicated how as a result of the unwise policy pur-
sued by Congress most of the timberlands of the country have 
gravitated into the hands of a few holders, and how, upon the 
basis of this concentration in the ownership of the standing tim-
ber, there have developed certain monopolistic conditions in the 
lumber manufacturing industry. It is the purpose of the pres-
ent article to consider the various ways of dealing with this 
so-called "lumber trust". 
Before proceeding with the question of remedies for the sit-
uation which faces us, it will be wise to note briefly just what 
the situation is, first, in regard to the ownership of standing 
timber, and second, in regard to the lumber manufacturing in-
dustry. 
The privately owned standing timber of the United States, 
according to the best estimates, amounts to some 2,197 billion 
feet, worth at least $6,000,000,000. Of this total amount about 
four-fifths were included in the area investigated by the Com-
missioner of Corporations; and of the amount in the investi-
gation area nearly hal£ was owned by holders of one billion 
feet or over; 32.2 per cent by holders of 3% billion feet or over; 
26 per cent by holders of 5 billion feet or over; and 19 per cent, 
nearly one-fifth, by holders of 13 billion feet or over. Over 
69 per cent of the unreserved timber in the investigation area 
is owned by holders of 60,000,000 feet or over. 
To illustrate the magnitude of some of these figures, it may 
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be stated that a billion feet of lumber would load a freight 
train 417 miles long, or would build about 65,000 ordinary five 
or six-room houses. 
Concentration of ownership in terms of board feet is suffi-
ciently startling, but perhaps nearly as significant are the 
figures in terms of acreage. The three largest timber holdings 
in the United States, those of the Southern Pacific, the Weyer-
haeuser Timber Company and the Northern Pacific, aggregate 
about 9,000,000 acres of timberland, some of it among the finest 
in the world. The five largest holdings in the country include 
12,794,000 acres, an average of 2,560,000 acres each. Among 
holdings smaller than these are 9 of from 500,000 to 1,500,000 
acres, averaging almost 1,000,000 acres each; 27 holdings of 
from 300,000 to 500,000 acres each; 48 holdings of from 150,-
000 to 300,000 acres; 124 of from 75,000 to 150,000 acres; and 
520 holdings of between 18,000 and 75,000 acres. Thus 733 
holders own in fee a total of 71,521,000 acres of timberland 
and land owned in connection with or in the vicinity of this 
timberland, an average of nearly 100,000 acres each. Nor is 
this all. There are 961 smaller holders owning a total of 
6,731,000 acres, an average for each of 7,000 acres, the equiva-
lent of 40 homesteads. This makes a total of over 78,000,000 
acres owned in fee by 1,694 holders, over one-twentieth of the 
land area of the United States, from the Canadian to the 
Mexican border. 
Several factors make the power of these large timber hold-
ers really much greater than any figures as to acreage or lum-
ber feet would indicate. In the first place, large timber hold-
ings are proportionately more valuable than small holdings, 
even when the timber is of only equal quality, because large 
holdings can be so much more economically managed in every 
way. In the second place, the large holdings in many places 
have the smaller holdings ''blocked in'' in such a way as to 
practically control them. In the third place, the large timber. 
holdings everywhere include the most valuable timber,-the 
heaviest stands and the most valuable species. In the fourth 
place, many of the various large holders are bound together 
by various interrelations of interests in such a way as to make 
possible common policies. Furthermore many of the large tim-
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ber owners are not cutting their timber, but are holding their 
estates intact and perhaps buying up smaller tracts for imme-
diate cutting. Finally, it is of course evident that with the 
rise in timber values the power of the holders of the remaining 
supply will be greatly augmented. 
Now upon the basis of this concentration in the ownership 
of standing timber, a monopolistic situation has developed in 
the manufacturing industry. Associations of manufacturers 
have been formed and have grown strong enough to manipulate 
prices to their own profit, sometimes by concerted curtailment 
of output, sometimes by adherence to a price list, sometimes 
by other means. 
The evidence presented in the Missouri Ouster Suit and 
likewise much other evidence that is available, indicates 
clearly that the lumber manufacturers are strongly organized 
and that they have often raised prices by illegal concerted 
efforts. 
The question now arises as to what remedy is proposed for 
such a situation as has been here briefly outlined.1 Four dif-
ferent methods of attack might be suggested. First, the Gov-
ernment may attack all unlawful combinations among lumber-
men or lumber dealers under the anti-trust laws, Federal and 
State, and in that way try to secure competitive prices for con-
sumers. In the second place, the Government might recognize 
the lumber business as a natural monopoly based on the pos-
session of a natural resource, and regulate prices through a 
commission. In the third place, since monopolistic conditions 
in the manufacture and distribution of lumber are in general 
based upon a monopoly of the standing timber, the Govern-
ment might perhaps strike at the root of the problem by im-
posing a graduated tax on timber holdings and in that way 
break up the large estates. In the fourth place the Government 
may simply extend the system of National Forests as rapidly 
•For excellent reeent diseussions of the trust problem, see artieles by Prof. 
E. Dana Durand in the Quarterly Journal of Eeonomics for May and August, 1914; 
and by Prof. W. H. S. Stevens in the Politieal Seience Quarterly for June and 
September, 1914. Among other works on the same subjeet are: (1) John Bates 
Clark, The Control of Trusts; (2) Riehard T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts; (3) 
Charles R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control; (4) Bruce Wyman, Control of 
the Market ; and a great number of other contributions of importance, The 
amount of trust literature is altogether . too great to be given consideration here. 
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as possible, and thus try to secure a large enough proportion 
of the timberland so that it can set prices for the public. 
The "trust-busting" policy was naturally the first one to be 
tried in this country, and since about 1906 the Federal Gov-
ernment and some of the state governments have been very 
active in their efforts to break up lumber combinations. In 
considering this government activity two questions arose: first, 
is it desirable to break up such combinations; and second, is it 
possible to do so. 
The problem of breaking up combinations in the lumber in-
dustry brings with it the whole question as to the advantages 
or economics of large-scale organization. It is impossible to 
go into a minute analysis of this question here, but it will be 
pertinent to suggest that many of the advantages claimed for 
large-scale organization in general are not of great importance 
in the manufacturing of lumber, because the most efficient unit 
in the business is comparatively small. ''To enlarge a mill 
beyond a capacity of 20 or 25 million feet a year is to duplicate 
mechanical units, with small or doubtful advantage in manu-
facture, and with certain disadvantage in the cost of transport-
ing logs. It is a matter of dispute among lumbermen whether 
a mill of 20 million feet capacity, under the usual conditions of 
transportation in the southern pine territory, is not more 
economical than a larger one.' '2 
There is without a doubt considerable economy in the so-
called "integration of industry," that is, in the union of va-
rious successive related processes under the same management. 
In certain regions it may frequently be in the interest of effi-
ciency and economy that a single organization should control 
the standing timber, own and operate all the logging equip-
ment, the saw-mill and perhaps even wholesale and retail es-
tablishments. It is almost everywhere desirable that mill own-
ers should own their own standing timber because in this way 
they can eliminate much of the element of uncertainty in the 
securing of timber supplies, and so insure the most economical 
use of milling capital. The contests between the loggers and 
the mill men on the Pacific coast, often resulting in very se-
vere losses to those concerned, indicate that logging and mill-
2Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Lumber Industry, I, 35, 36. 
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ing should if possible be carried on by the same organization. 
Now while the most efficient sawmall is not a very large 
unit in itself, if with it are included the various other items 
which may be effectively combined, a rather large initial in-
vestment is indicated,-in some regions an investment of mil-
lions of dollars. The purchase of several thousand acres of 
valuable timberland,-enough to guarantee a timber supply 
for the reasonable life of an efficient mill, in itself involves a 
very heavy outlay; and in some regions, as for instance in the 
cypress fields, logging equipment represents a large expense. 
The cost of drying kilns, the capital tied up in drying woods, 
and the advances to loggers and mill hands amount to consid-
erable sums. 
It may be stated at this point, however, that it has not been 
the policy of the Government to attack such integrated organ-
izations as have been suggested. The Government has made no 
objection to the combination of timber ownership, lumber man-
ufacturing and all other processes under one management, but 
has merely tried to prevent the combination of a number of 
these large units into one association for the purpose of manip-
ulating prices. It is clear that this latter sort of combination, 
the combination of similar units performing similar functions, 
the so-called "horizontal" combination, is an entirely different 
proposition. It not only represents vastly more power, but it 
certainly does not effect the same economies. 
Some economies there may easily be, however, even in this 
latter type of combination. Doubtless it may secure cheaper 
distribution of the product, through a reduction in advertis-
ing and selling expenses, and a saving in cross freights. Per-
haps it may prevent some needless duplication of plants,-an 
important consideration in the lumber industry where there is 
always a considerable amount of capital tied up in useless 
milling and logging equipment. It might even permit some 
specialization among the various mills, although this is not cer-
tain. Experience has already shown that combination can do 
much in adjusting the supply of lumber to the demand, thus 
securing more stable conditions in the industry. This is a con-
sideration of great importance because of the fact that the lum-
ber industry is peculiarly sensitive to changes in the general 
22 THE AMES FORESTER 
business situation. Whether co~bination among lumber opera-
tors would result in the adoption of more efficient accounting 
methods or better machinery is perhaps not quite certain, but 
there might be some gain here. 
There is thus something to be said for the economies of com-
bination even in the lumber business. It should of course be 
noted that while the lumber industry presents examples of a 
great many different kinds of combination, most of the lumber 
associations are not closely knit organizations, many of them 
not strong enough to secure all of the advantages possible to 
effective combination. 
Even if we admit the desirability of breaking up these com-
binations, there still remains the question as to the possibility 
of doing it. .As indicated in the preceding chapter monopo-
listic combinations have existed in most fields of the lumber 
industry, often strong enough to raise prices materially; and 
in spite of the activity of Federal and State prosecuting agents, 
many of these combinations still exist. Most of them have 
altered their form of organization or their scheme of opera-
tions; others have been weakened; but many are still strong 
enough to manipulate prices to their own profit, and, from 
evidence at hand, are doing it. The Government has certainly 
not been entirely successful in its policy of breaking up lumber 
combinations, and there is no reason to believe that it will be 
in the immediate furture. 
Some success, however, has certainly been achieved. No stu-
dent of the recent history of the lumber business can fail to 
concede that the vigilance of the Federal and State govern-
ments has broken up some of the worst forms of monopoly 
activity; has driven some illegal combinations to cover; and, 
perhaps more impotent than all, has to some extent pr~vented 
the formation of others. Monopolistic activitit s have been, to 
say the least, more difficult since 1906; and some that were 
possible before that date, have been impossible since. It is 
doubtful whether the lumber industry as a whole is as strongly 
organized now (1915), as it was ten years ago. The decision 
in the Missouri ouster suit for instance, was a crushing blow to 
the yellow pine ring; and the provisions of the verdict rendered 
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would seem to promise something for the effectiveness of Gov-
ernment control. 
To what extent the attitude of the Government has prevented 
the formation of new lumber combinations, it is of course diffi-
cult to judge intelligently. It is perhaps significant, however, 
that nearly all of the powerful lumber associations had their 
inception before the time of Government anti-trust activity, 
which dates from about 1906. The National Lumber Manufac-
turers' Association was organized in 1902. The Missouri and 
Arkansas _Lumber Association, perhaps the earliest of the yel-
low pine associations, dates from 1883; and the Southern Lum-
ber Association, later to become the Yellow Pine Manufactur-
ers' Association, was organized in 1890. The Georgia Saw Mill 
Association, the predecessor of the Georgia-Florida Saw Mill 
Association, was formed in 1899. The first organization in the 
field of North Carolina pine dates from 1888, and the present 
North Carolina Pine Association was formed in 1905, by the 
union of the old North Carolina Pine Association and the South 
Carolina Pine Association, both of which had been organized 
some years previously. 
In the Douglas fir territory as elsewhere, lumbermen's or-
ganizations run back to the period previous to 1906. The log-
gers of Puget Sound organized the Puget Sound Timbermen's 
Association as early as 1899, and this organization has persisted 
under various names. The Washington Logging and Brokerage 
Company, since 1907 known as the Washington Log Brokerage 
Company, was formed in 1904. The three associations among 
the mill men of this region; the Southwestern Washington 
Lumber Manufacturers' Association, the Pacific Coast Lumber 
Manufacturers' Association and the Oregon and Washington 
Lumber Manufacturers' Association, were organized in 1900 
and 1901. The combination of these three into the West Coast 
Lumber Manufacturers' Association was, however, not effected 
until 1911; and some supsidiary price regulating organizations 
in this region have also been formed in very recent years. 
In other fields of the lumber industry, as in those mentioned, 
most of the present lumber combinations were formed previous 
to 1906, although some consolidations and reorganizations 
have been effected more recently. In this connection it must 
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be pointed out that most fields of the lumber business were 
fairly well organized before the Government began its anti-
monopoly campaign, and that therefore there has been no 
great occasion for the formation of new organizations since; 
nevertheless, bearing all the evidence in mind, we can scarcely 
esc~pe the conclusion that the number of such monopolistic 
organizations is now less than it would have been but for the 
hostile attitude of the Government. The abandonment of the 
proposed North Carolina Pine merger is a case in point. 
Finally then, as to the effectiveness of Government efforts 
to break up lumber combinations, the most definite conclusion 
that the information at hand will justify, is that, while the 
lumber industry is still strongly organized, part of it perhaps 
entirely beyond the reach of anti-trust prosecution, neverthe-
less the Government has accomplished something, has even 
achieved some notable success. Some students of the question 
may feel that with further experience, with improvement in the 
anti-trust laws and in the machinery for their enforcement, 
with the elimination of various unfair practices, with increas-
ing publicity of corporate affairs, and with the development of 
supplementary legislation, such as for instance, Federal incor-
poration laws, the Government will be able to handle the lum-
ber situation successfully, without departing from its present 
policy. Other students of the question will view the situation 
more pessimistically, will feel that it is impossible to break up 
combinations in this way, that as fast as the Government de-
vises new methods of attack, the lumber organizations will in-
vent new means of evasion, and that in the end, the Govern-
ment will be driven to direct regulation of prices. 
The possible advantages of combination in the lumber indus-
try have been indicated above, and certainly they must be given 
due consideration. Whether these advantages are so great, 
however, and whether their preservation is a matter of much 
importance as to justify the Government in abandoning its 
present policy, to embark upon a wholly untried scheme of 
price regulation, is quite another question. 
The idea of price regulation by means .of a commission seems 
attractive in many ways.3 It has a directness, a finality, an 
•van Hise, Concentration and Control, 238-242. 
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apparent simplicity even, which presents a strong appeal to 
certain minds. It is perfectly conceivable too that if the Gov-
ernment is to engage in the regulation of prices at all, lumber 
prices might seem as good a point of attack as any. The in-
dustry is based on a natural monopoly, is fairly well central-
ized, the product simple and generally well standardized. Fur-
thermore the cost of production, as far as that might enter into 
the fixing of price, could be as easily determined for lumber 
as for almost any product. 
It will be profitable, however, to point out certain objections 
to this scheme, to indicate briefly some of the difficulties in-
volved. Immediately questions arise as to the personnel and 
manner of appointing such a commission, and the scope of its 
powers. To be effective, it must, of course, have broad powers, 
and this would make its personnel a matter of the greatest im-
portance. Clearly if the lumber interests were to have a 
strong representation on the commission its work might amount 
to little or nothing. It is scarcely to be doubted that any rep-
resentatives of other lines of business on this commission would 
line up with the lumber representatives in most events, because 
once the Government embarked on a policy of price regulatl.on, 
most lines of big business would cooperate in common self-de-
fense. Experience with minimum wage commissions points 
to the possibility of difficulties of this nature. 
It would perhaps be fairly easy to conceive of an ideal com-
mission, with a majority of highly trained men who could han-
dle the business with intelligence, but it is easier to conceive 
of a commission created accordng to canons of political expe-
diency, the fruit of political debates and trades and compro-
mises rather than of intelligent and judicious planning. Ex-
perience with the Interstate Commerce Commission indicates 
that it would take many years of experimenting to develop any 
degree of efficiency in the regulation of prices. 
The price regulating commission would presumably be a Fed-
eral institution, and the definition of its powers and jurisdiction 
would present certain difficulties. It could get jurisdiction 
only under the interstate commerce clause of the constitution, 
and so would be unable to reach lumber which did not enter 
into interstate commerce, unless effective cooperation were se-
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cured with state commissions of similar nature. The difficulty 
of securing such cooporation with some of the states, and the 
tangle that would result from a failure to secure it can easily 
be understood. Some states might feel that Federal prices 
were too high; others, where lumber interests were strong, 
might feel that they were too low. A situation might even 
conceivably arise in which consumers in a lumber producing 
state would have to pay a high price, fixed by the organized 
lumbermen of the state, or by a commission under their in-
fluence, while consumers across the state line were getting the 
same lumber at a low price, fixed by the Federal commission. 
A host of unforseen complications would certainly arise in con-
nection with the mere question of jurisdiction. Of course 
amendment of the constitution of the United States would 
clear away some of these difficulties, but amendment could 
be secured only after a long and energetic campaign, if at all; 
and even if it were accomplished, state constitutions might 
still interpose obstacles to effective price regulation. 
The most serious difficulties connected with the whole scheme 
would of course enter with the matter of price determination; 
and the first question would be as to the basis upon which 
prices should be determined. A vast number of items would 
clearly have to be considered: cost of labor; logging and 
milling equipment, original cost, interest charge and deprecia-
tion; more remote items, such as fire protection and taxes, (in 
the first instance these would have to be reckoned for years 
previous); and perhaps more important than all, the value 
of the standing timber. 
A very careful system of cost accounting would be needed 
here, and it is probable that the Government would have to 
prescribe a uniform system for all lumber manufacturers. 
Many of the mills have had no effective system in the past, 
and it might be many years before the Commission would have 
enough comparative data to proceed with intelligence. 
The value of the standing timber would have to be con-
sidered. In most cases a price has been paid for it, and to fix 
a uniform price schedule without considering this price at aU 
would be confiscation; whether the manufacturers themselves 
own the timber or whether they buy from timber owners. This 
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is not to assume that the original price, or even any subsequent 
price paid, is an accurate index to the value of the timber, for 
it may have no significance whatever. For instance the $6.00 
per acre paid in the great Weyerhaeuser purchase of 1900 has 
no significance as to the present value of the land. In order 
to get any idea of present values it might be necessary to in-
stitute an extensive and thorough cruise of all the timberlands 
in the country. 
Unfortunately, however, it appears at this point that the 
whole idea of considering present values in the fixing of a p:fice 
schedule involves a logical absurdity, a "vicious circle" in rea-
soning. How can any price be fixed on the basis of the present 
value of standing timber, when the value of the standing tim-
ber is directly determined by the price fixed 1 The value of 
standing timber depends upon the price at which it is antici-
pated, the lumber can finally be sold; and how can it serve as 
the basis for determining the price at which it is to be sold 1 
How can timber values and lumber prices each be in turn cause 
and effect 1 
In the case of joint products special complications would 
arise. For instance the yellow pine forests of the South pro-
duce turpentine and lumber. Hemlock is valuable for its bark 
as well as for its wood. How shall the price of the lumber be 
determined with relation to the other products? Some mills 
produce different kinds of products, lumber of many kinds 
and grades, shingles or lath, and perhaps excelsior. How much 
of the fixed charges and how much of the operating expenses 
shall be attributed to each product 1 
It might sometimes be difficult to adjust the price of dif-
ferent kinds of woods so as to do justice to each section of the 
country. As long as there is competition between different 
sections of the country this matter is regulated, but if once 
this competition were eliminated it might be very difficult to 
find a satisfactory basis for the determination of relative values 
in the various markets of the country. 
Under the present regime, to a considerable extent competi-
tive, most lumber prices tend to :fluctuate greatly, because of 
the fact that the demand for lumber is extremely variable, 
while the supply responds only tardily. Now it is clear that 
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no commission would be able to change the price schedule with 
any degree of facility; and the establishment of fixed prices 
would bring in unprecedented conditions which can scarcely 
be more than guessed at. In times of business activity exces-
sively large amounts of lumber would be demanded, because 
there would be no rise in prices to discourage its use; in times 
of depression very little would be called for because there 
would be no lowering of prices to stimulate demand. How 
could th7 supply be adjusted to such a widely varying demand 1 
Even under present conditions, there is a great waste in the 
industry, because so much capital is idle during slack seasons, 
and it seems that this waste would be much greater under the 
circumstances suggested. 
It might be suggested that the commission could vary prices 
according to changing industrial conditions, but even if this 
were possible, it is very doubtful if it would be a wise policy 
because of the uncertainty and uneasiness it would bring into 
the situation. It seems that prices fixed by the commission 
would tend to remain the same for considerable periods, per-
haps even for years, somewhat like the rates fixed by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission. 
Lumber prices will certainly show a strong upward tendency 
for a long time, and as prices gradually rise consumption will 
decline and waste will be reduced. The higher prices will have 
a conserving tendency. It is interesting to speculate as to 
what would happen if a Government commission were regulat-
ing prices. As stated above, there would be a strong tendency 
f.or such a commission to fix a certain level of prices and ad-
here to it, perhaps for years. The changing relations of supply 
and demand would present no just ground for altering the 
schedule unless there were also increasing costs of some kind. 
Now: with the growth in the population of the country the de-
mand for timber will certainly increase; and if prices were to 
remain about the same, might not our timber supply be very 
speedily exhausted? Would there be any incentive for timber 
owners to preserve their timber for the future? Certainly the 
expectation of a future rise in stumpage values is the chief rea-
son why many timber owners are not clearing their land now; 
and if this hope of future profit were taken away, if holders 
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felt that prices would remain the same for a long period, they 
would cut their timber as fast as the market would absorb the 
product, unless the Government also in some way taxed or 
regulated the output. 
If the commission were to follow a policy of permitting lum-
bermen to raise prices merely because the supply of timber was 
decreasing, when there was no increase in the cost of produc-
tion, it seems that it would to some extent fail in its avowed 
purpose, which is to protect consumers from unreasonably 
high prices. 
Advocates of Government regulation of prices sometimes 
point to the experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
as an example of success in Government regulation. Without 
entering into any discussion of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and its work, it may be said that it is not very signifi-
cant as to the desirability or feasibility of regulating general 
commodity prices. In the first place it was absolutely neces-
sary that interstate commerce rates be regulated; and this 
cannot be said of lumber prices. In the second place, perhaps 
it cannot be said that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
has been so successful in its work up to the present date as to 
throw a particulaTly favorable light upon the general policy 
of Government regulation. The commission has been mainly 
interested in preventing unjust discrimination between per-
sons, localities or kinds of freight, and has done very little, if 
anything, in the :fixing of specific schedules. The general rate 
structure for the country as a whole has been determined al-
most entirely by the railroads themselves. There is little prob-
ability that the commission itself could ever have made out 
entire rate schedules for the roailroads, and applied them suc-
cessfully. The work now done by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission is very different in many ways from that which 
would be required of a commission for the regulation of lum-
ber prices. 
It might of course be argued that the lumber commission 
could follow out a policy similar to that of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, simply adopt the present price schedules of 
the lumber companies and permit no advances except upon 
proof that such advances were reasonable. Since lumber 
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prices will for a long time tend to rise, the commission might 
thus reduce its work to merely "sitting tight", allowing few 
advances, and meantime regulating such matters as unjust 
discrimination and unfair practices. 
It seems probable that the price regulating commission would 
adopt a policy somewhat similar to this; and possibly it would 
prove successful. It may be well to point out, however, that 
many of the difficulties urged above to the general scheme of 
price regulation would be encountered jn this procedure as 
well. The questions of personnel, manner of appointment, and 
jurisdiction would not be simplified. A careful accounting sys-
tem would be needed, although perhaps it would not be so 
important as if price schedules were to be fixed immediately 
by the commission. 
The questions regarding joint products and the relation of 
prices of different woods might be largely solved by the lum-
ber companies themselves without much interference from the 
commissiOn. The problem of adjusting supply to demand 
would not be simplified; low prices would in any case stimulate 
forest destruction; and if the value of standing timber were 
to be reckoned in the determination of prices, it would involve 
the same circle of reasoning that was pointed out above. 
One objection which is sometimes urged against price regu-
lation in general, is that it leads to Government ownership and 
socialism; but this objection has very little force when applied 
to the lumber industry, for Government owner~;hip is the ideal 
toward which we should be working. 
Perhaps it may seem that since monopoly conditions in the 
manufacture and distribution of lumber are dependent on 
ownership of the standing timbe~, the logical procedure would 
be to attack the question there, to break up in some way the 
monopolistic control of standing timber, break up the large 
holdings.4 
There are several reasons why the present situation in regard 
to the ownership of standing timber would seem to demand 
some kind of a remedy; some reasons why, as a matter of equity 
'See E. Dana Durand, The Trust Problem, in the Quarterly Journal of Ee~ 
nomics: August, 1914, 672-674. 
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and justice if nothing more, the large holders might be shorn 
of some of their power. In the first place we must recognize 
that no labor is required to discover standing timber, as con-
trasted with such natural resources as iron ore, coal, or petro-
leum. The search for minerals is a real public service ; but 
timber is conspicuous upon the surface, and could never fail 
of being turned to account for lack of knowledge of its exis-
tence. 
Not only have timber owners as a class rendered no particu-
lar service in "finding" and appropriating timber lands, but 
many of them have given no equivalent in any other way for 
the valuable resource they now hold; many of them have 
merely stolen their lands. As indicated in previous chapters, 
many of the railway grants were not really earned; the two 
great timber owning railroads, the Northern Pacific and the 
Southern Pacific, presenting notable examples of bad faith in 
their disposition of their grants. Various other railroads fur-
nish examples quite as bad on a smaller scale. Swamp lands 
were often, perhaps usually, acquired fraudulently, and the 
terms of such grants were not often complied with. Most tim-
ber lands acquired under the Timber and Stone Act, the Com-
mutation Homestead Act, the Preemption Act, and the Desert 
Land Act, were acquired fraudulently; indeed there was about 
one general public land law under which large holdings could 
be honestly taken up, and that was the Cash Sale Law, and 
even under that law the payment for the lands was of course 
grossly inadequate. 
Since so much of the timberland was stolen in the first place, 
there might seem to be special reason why a few holders should 
not own it all, special reason why the Government might try 
to regain control over more of this resource, or might try to 
secure a more equal division, perhaps break up some of the 
large estates in some way. In judging of the wisdom of any 
such plan of procedure it will of course be proper to consider 
that a vested wrong may in time become a vested right; that 
much of this land is not now in the hands of the original hold-
ers; that some of it is now owned by holders who have paid 
full value; and that the proportion of such holders will grow 
from year to year as more of this land changes hands. 
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If we were to go so far as to advocate breaking up of some 
of these great timber estates in some way, the most obvious 
method would of course be taxation, perhaps a progressive tax, 
somewhat after the Australian or New Zealand plan, impos-
ing an especially heavy burden on the very large holdings. It 
might be argued that this would tend to encourage the division 
of these holdings into moderate sized tracts; or that eyen .if it 
did not have any decided tendency that way, it wo_uld at any 
rate be equitable as a system of taxation, apportioning burdens 
according to ability, since the real wealth, power, or "ability" 
of these large holders is· more than proportionate to the size 
of their holdings. If furthermore, it saddled a special burd~n 
upon a class of large-scale land thieves, so much the better. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to enter into an exhaus-
tive discussion of the progressive tax, or of the general ques-
tion of remedies for our timber situation; but it will be worth 
while to consider briefly a few very weighty objections to any 
scheme of breaking up the large holdings by means of a grad-
uated tax on timberlands. 
In the first place, aside from all questions of constitutionality 
or conflict of jurisdictions, such a scheme may seem unfair to 
some holders, for some who have purchased a recent years, 
have paid full value for their land. 
In the second place, any tax graduated sufficiently to be ef-
fective would promote a rapid forest destruction which is ex-
actly what conservationists should wish to avoid. It has 
everywhere been observed that heavy taxation of forest land 
results in premature cutting of the timber. 
The decisive argument against the taxation scheme suggested 
is, however, that it is not desirable to break up these large 
holdings. The Australian and New Zealand ~axes apply to ag-
ricultural land, and are probably justified by social considera-
tions.5 It is not desirable to have agricultural lands in large 
states; but the situation in regard to forest land is quite dif-
ferent. A large holding of timber land is proportionately 
easier to protect from fire and fr.om trespass, and is more eco-
nomically managed in every way. The cost of fire protection 
is a very important item in the timber business, and for the 
•Seligman, Essays in Taxation. Eighth edition, 459-466, 516-522. 
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large holdings this cost is proportionately much lower than for 
the small holdings and protective measures are far more effec-
tive; indeed it is almost impossible to afford adequate protec-
tion to a number of scattered small lots. The holder of any 
such lot is very much ·at the mercy of his neighbors, any one 
of whom may by carelessness jeopardize all the timber in the 
community. The breaking up of timberlands into small hold-
ings would thus increase the cost and decrease the effectiveness 
of.:fire protection and of management in almost every way. 
Perhaps the best thing that could be said for a progressive 
tax is that it would not really be effective because it would be 
evaded. ;Many large holders would doubtless pretend to break 
up their holdings, but would retain control through gentle-
men's agreements and through various other subterfuges so 
common in the general field of monopoly. If in this way the 
tax could be rendered ineffective it would perhaps do little 
harm, but of course it would then yield no revenue and would 
have no excuse for existence. 
No doubt some scheme of taxing the annual cut would be 
better than a tax on the land, and tax legislation is turning to 
this more and more in recent years. It is difficult, however, 
to see how this tax could be graduated in such a way as to 
break up large estates. It might of course be graduated so as 
to bear heavier upon those establishments having the ~arger 
output, or it might be imposed only on the larger organizations, 
(those larger than the unit of maximum efficiency); but it is 
not easy to see how this would improve upon the policy of 
breaking up trusts, except that it would tend better to con-
serve the timber supply. 
The reasons why forests should be owned by the Government 
have been discussed in various connections, in fact, the wisdom, 
perhaps we may even say the necessity of Government owner-
ship, is the great outstanding lesson to be gained from tlie 
study of the United States forest policy as outlined in the pre-
eeding chapters. Almost all the advanced countries of the 
world have found it necessary to take over the management of 
their forests; and the United States must eventually enlarge 
her field of activities along this line. 
Our National Forests will of course play a more important 
34 THE AMES FORESTER 
part in the future than they do now. At the present time they 
are of course much less important than their area would indi-
cate, because only part of the land is timbered, and the timber 
included is of poor quality and inaccessible. The Forest Serv-
ice is handling the timber very conservatively, however, cutting 
less than the annual growth, so that the amount of Govern-
ment timber is even increasing; while the privately owned tim-
ber is being cut at a very rapid rate. Furthermore the Govern-
ment is slowly taking over tracts of denuded land under the 
Weeks Law, and is again planting it with trees. Thus the 
relative importance of the publicly owned timber is bound to 
increase greatly in the future, and this will tend to prevent the 
large private holders from too gross abuse of their power. 
In conclusion then, it appears that of the several remedies 
suggested for our lumber and timber situation, the only one 
worthy of unqualified approval is the last,-the extension of 
Government ownership and control. The scheme of breaking 
up large timber holdings by means of a progressive tax has 
been as unqualifiedly rejected. In regard to the two other 
remedies considered, it has seemed wise to take no stand, but 
merely to point out the various advantages and disadvantages 
that might be claimed for each plan of procedure. It is hoped 
that this caution and conservatism will not lay the writer open 
to crimticism on the ground of having avoided or glossed over 
vital issues. Much has been written about trusts and monopolies 
in general, about the Standard Oil Company and the United 
States Steel Corporation, and various other monopolistic com-
binations; but comparatively little is generally known about 
the lumber industry. The report of the Commissioner of Cor-
porations contains a vast amount of valuable information; but 
this report is about the only ready source of information, 
has been given little general publicity, and it is not at all 
concerned with the question of remedies . 
. Thus the writer is exploring new fields, and abundant caution 
would seem to be fully justified. If the above suggestions 
to remedies have any effect in arousing interest in the matter, 
in stimulating others to follow up with fuller knowledge 
more careful analysis, their inclusion here will perhaps be 
tified. 
